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The birth, growth, stabilization and subsequent understanding of a new
field of practical and theoretical enquiry is always a conceptual process includ-
ing several typologies of events, phenomena and figures spanning often over a
long historical period. This is especially true when the field in question is not
uniquely identified by either the Academia, or the Laboratory, or the Industry.
Computing is a paradigmatic case. So diverse and conflicting are its origins,
that the debates on the nature of computer science have characterized its whole
history. From its early beginnings onward, computing has been variously la-
belled as a technology, a science and as a form of mathematics. It has been said
that computing is a discipline dealing with machines that compute (See [35]),
with information processed by such machines (See [28]) or with the algorithms
that direct the behaviour of such processes (See [31]). Today, when comput-
ers are so extensively present in our lives, one would expect that theoreticians
and practitioners in the field of computing would have found, at least, some
consensus on these questions. The opposite is true however and there is still
much controversy on the scientific, engineering and experimental qualifications
pertaining to the discipline.1
With the rise of the modern computer and the practices that surrounded it,
came the realization that modern computing is as much a product of engineering
as it is the result of formal and mathematical science. For instance, as Stan
Ulam, an important figure in early computing practices of the late 40s and 50s,
recounted:
∗This is a preprint of the following paper: L. De Moland G. Primiero (2015), When logic
meets engineering: fundamental issues in the history and philosophy of computer science,
History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 36, nr. 3, pp. 195–204.
1See [43] for a recent in-depth study of the past and ongoing debates on what computer
science is.
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It is perhaps a matter of chance, that computer development be-
came possible only by a confluence of at least two entirely different
streams. One is the purely theoretical study of formal systems. The
study of how to formalize a description of natural phenomena or even
of mathematical facts. [...] The whole idea of proceeding by a given
set of rules from a given set of axioms was studied successfully in this
connection. The second stream is the technological development in
electronics, which came at just the right time. (46, p. 94)
These two different aspects of computer science, moreover, are not strictly sep-
arated: logic and technology work together, from the lowest hardware level,
governed by Boolean circuits and arithmetical operations in the stack mem-
ory; through the structure of assignment, sequencing, branching and iteration
operations defining modern high-level programming languages; up to the equiv-
alent abstract formulations of recursive definitions for algorithms. Accordingly,
(the history of) computer science can be understood only by investigating the
non-straightforward and non-linearly proceeding interactions between logic and
engineering practices, which influenced each other and which received, more-
over, further stimuli from external areas such as developments in business or
the experimental sciences.
The logical roots of computer science are, at least, well-known. They can
be traced back to the extensively studied debate on the foundations of mathe-
matics from the end of the XIXth – early XXth century. The Grundlagenkrisis
in mathematics notoriously brought the three foundationalist approaches to the
fore: the logicist, the formalist and the intuitionist programmes.2 The derivation
of Russell’s Paradox in Frege’s Begriffschrift determined the collapse of the first
of these programmes, which aimed at deriving all mathematics from purely log-
ical notions. This drawback in the search for foundations meant that Hilbert’s
finitist and formalist programme was reinvigorated in its attack of problems such
as consistency and decidability. It is within this context that the work by math-
ematicians such as Church, Kleene, Post and Turing has its origins. They each
contributed in making the idea of calculation a central topic in logic, by propos-
ing different formalizations of computability ([44]), effective calculability ([6]),
generated set ([38])3 and solvability ([39]).4 These formalizations were entirely
in the spirit of the formalist programme, in the sense that they allow ‘to abstract
from the meaning of the symbols and to regard the proving of theorems (of for-
mal logic) as a game played with marks on paper according to a certain arbitrary
2See respectively [3], [48] and [29] for a historical representation of these three programmes.
For a collection of source texts on the foundations of mathematics, see [47].
3Post developed this notion and its formalization in terms of generated sets in 1921 and
proved on its basis the (absolute) unsolvability of a particular decision problem for his normal
systems. However, he did not submit the results to a journal. In 1941 he submitted an
account of this work from the early 20s to the American Journal of Mathematics. The paper
was rejected but a shortened version was finally accepted and published in 1943.
4These notions of course expanded on iteration and recursion, whose first definitions can
be traced back to Bolzano (unnoticed), Cauchy and Weierstrass. See [1] for an extensive but
accessible historical recollection of the notion of recursion as the foundation of computability.
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set of rules’ ([5]). Such formalizations were required to prove that there is in
fact no finite method to solve Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem, or other related
decision problems. As such, these results, next to Go¨del’s incompleteness, broke
Hilbert’s dream of making mathematics void of ignorabimus. The fundamental
problem of determining for any assertion of first-order calculus whether or not it
is valid, Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem (Decision Problem) in its original form,
was proven (recursively) unsolvable by Church, who showed it depends on the
recursive solvability of problems in the λ-calculus5 and by Turing who showed its
dependence on the decidability of decision problems for Turing machines, most
notably the problem which we know today as the halting problem.6,7 Similar
problems were also proven unsolvable by Post already in the early 20s. Despite
this strict link to effective calculability, the mere idea of using computations in
mathematics was very much opposed by Hilbert, who considered the practical
concerns of calculation removed from his interests.8 Ironically, it were exactly
the different formalist devices and techniques by which impossibility results were
obtained, such as the universal Turing machine or the λ-calculus, that would
also allow to provide (some of) the theoretical foundations of computer science.9
The third foundationalist programme also had an important and lasting in-
fluence on the theoretical foundation of computing. Brouwer’s subject-based
constructivist interpretation of mathematical truths, resulting in the formaliza-
tion of Intuitionistic Logic by Kolmogorov and Heyting in the early ’30s with the
rejection of the Law of Excluded Middle, reflected more closely the algorithmic
reconstruction of the rules for classical predicate logic. This approach matched
the idea of execution of rules for a classical language. Later, the coupling of
logic and computation was advanced further. The algorithmic operators S,K, I
of the combinatorial calculus were defined as computationally equivalent repre-
sentations by trees of any operation in the (untyped) version of the λ-calculus
5That is, his formalization of effective calculability (next to general recursive functions).
More precisely, he proved that the problem to decide for any λ-defined formula whether or
not it has a normal form is recursively unsolvable (Theorem XVIII of [6]). On the basis of this
result, Church was able to show that the Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable in any system
of symbolic logic which is adequate to a certain portion of arithmetic and is ω-consistent
(as a Corollary of Theorem XIX in [6].). In another short paper [7], he then showed that
this result can be extended to first-order logic, hence proving the unsolvability of Hilbert’s
Entscheidungsproblem.
6More specifically, Turing proved that there exists no (Turing) machine which allows to
decide for any Turing machine whether or not it is circular or circle-free. In Turing’s termi-
nology, circularity means that the machine never writes down more than a finite number of
symbols (halting behavior). A non-circular machine is a machine that never halts and keeps
printing digits of some computable sequence of numbers. On its basis, Turing then proved
that also the problem to determine for any given machine whether or not it will ever print
some symbol x cannot be computed by a Turing machine and showed that this problem can
be reduced to first-order logic.
7For a comparative study of the different formalizations proposed by Church, Kleene, Post
and Turing and their connection with decision problems, see [22].
8In an influential report on algebraic number theory known as Zahlbericht and published
in 1897, Hilbert explicitly favours a more conceptual approach over a computational one (See
for instance [8] for more details).
9See for instance the papers by Felice Cardone and Edgar Daylight in this volume.
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(and hence to recursive functions). In this they constituted a further Turing
complete language. The equivalence of the type of such operators to the axiom
schemas
K : A→ (B → A)
S : (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
and function application corresponding to Modus Ponens made this in turn
equivalent to the implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (and hence the
typed λ-calculus), as suggested by Curry; this equivalence was later rediscov-
ered by Howard for natural deduction, a correspondence known today as the
Curry-Howard isomorphism, which influenced the construction of computational
systems like Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory and (much later) the development of
proof checkers and automated theorem provers, such as Coq and Isabelle/HOL.
The family of strongly normalizing typed systems are today the basis for vari-
ous functional programming languages, with guarantee of important properties
such as termination (by strong normalization) and memory access consistency
(by typing).
But the relevance of these formal results in logic for later computing prac-
tices were certainly not evident, if not entirely disregarded, in the early days: the
modern computer was not developed yet and the original context of those formal
works was pure rather than applied mathematics. In this latter context, human
and machine computational practices became more and more important because
of, amongst others, advances in military research, requiring for example new fir-
ing tables for every type of new gunnery.10 It is for instance well-known today
that ENIAC, one of the first electronic and programmable computers, was the
answer to the problems encountered at the Ballistic Research Lab at Aberdeen
Proving Ground with the timely computation of ballistic tables: the combina-
tion of the computations of the differential analyzer – an analogue machine –
and the teams of human computers could not cope with the demands of the
military. They were too slow.11 It was within this context of slow, error-prone
human and machine computations that the first electronic and programmable
computers such as ENIAC, the Baby Manchester machine, the EDSAC or the
ACE and EDVAC designs were developed in the late 1940s.12 These machines
were real behemoths when compared to modern-day computers and access to
10In [37] the following description is given of firing tables: ‘[D]uring the Wold War II
period [t]he Army depended entirely on the accurate aiming of shells our guns fired at enemy
targets. [...] The procedure was to aim first at enemy targets based on information provided
in firing tables and, in the event the target was missed, to make corrections on information
also provided by these tables [...] The information in the table was used directly by the gunner
or was incorporated in the firing mechanism appended at the artillery equipment, anti-aircraft
gun, or bomb sight ’. For a detailed study of calculatory practices before the rise of the modern
computer, see [23].
11See [23, 37].
12There has been much debate within the history of computing about ‘the first’ computer.
Today, historians consider this question no longer legitimate since much depends on how one
defines ‘computer’ and adjectives such as ‘stored-program’ or ‘general-purpose’ which one
often associates with it.
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them was restricted to a selected number of people with diverse backgrounds:
engineers, like Eckert and Mauchly, but also mathematicians or logicians like
Turing, von Neumann or Curry. Partly thanks to the war effort, these people
were forced to work together and disciplinary boundaries had to be crossed,
especially between pure mathematics and engineering. Before that time, the
connection between logic and digital circuitry had been made, amongst others,
by Claude Shannon and Victor Shestakov who showed how to represent digital
circuits by Boolean algebras.13 Beyond this basic hardware level, though, the
electronic programmable computer required a deeper reflection on the use of
logic to control computations: on the one hand, programmability meant the
possibility of use for a variety of purposes; on the other, the electronic nature
of computers meant they were too fast for humans to follow the computation.
As von Neumann explained (49, p. 2):
[It is] necessary to consider carefully the ability of the computing
mechanism to take our intention correctly. And the person control-
ling the machine must foresee where it can go astray, and prescribe
in advance for all contingencies. To appreciate this, contemplate the
prospect of locking twenty people for two years during which they
would be steadily performing computations. And you must give
them such explicit instructions at the time of incarceration that at
the end of two years you could return and obtain the correct result
for your lengthy problem! This dramatizes the necessity for high
planning, foresight, and consideration of the logical nature of com-
putation. This integration of logic in the problem is a consequence
of the high speed. [m.i.]
Computers were born from the need of speed and precision in computations; and
now logic was called for controlling (the correctness of) computations that were
too fast for humans to check. One application of this requirement is the so-called
stored-program idea which, roughly speaking, meant storing both instructions
and data in the machine.14 Another application was the development of the
flowchart notation by von Neumann and Goldstine which relies heavily on logical
terminology (for instance, the use of bound and free variables).
With the need for logical control over dynamically performed computations
came also the need to develop communication means, feasible for both ma-
chine and human user. In the early days, such communications proceeded ei-
ther through direct physical wiring (as in the case of the orginal ENIAC) or
through a very primitive order code very close to the machine. As a result,
‘programming’ the machine, as we call it today, was an extremely laborious and
13See [41] and [42].
14See [26] for a detailed discussion of the stored-program concept. This principle has led to
attributing the invention of the modern computer to Turing, because his Universal Machine
requires instructions to be treated as data and conversely. It is clear, though, from recent
historical research, that the development of the idea of the electronic, general-purpose and
stored-program computer is more complicated and cannot be attributed to Turing alone. See
especially [10] and [25].
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error-prone task and it became clear that much time could be gained if one
could communicate with the machine in a ‘language’ that would abstract more
from the hardware and allow to automate processes, e.g. calling a subroutine
and returning to the main procedure.15 Of course, this meant also the need for
a computational method to ‘translate’ such language to machine language. In
this way, the steady development of so-called high-level programming languages
and compilers went hand-in-hand. The first compilers and languages were de-
veloped in the late 50s. Logic kept playing a crucial role: to give a few examples,
Haskell B. Curry, who had also worked with ENIAC, developed in the late 40s
a theory of program composition insisting on the significance of formal logic in
this context;16 Chomsky relied on Post’s formal devices to define his hierarchy
of languages which even today forms the foundation of compiler design;17 Mc-
Carthy used notions coming from λ-calculus and recursive functions to define
the LISP language.18 Simplicity of programming and increasing computational
power helped the commercialization of the computers, the emergence of the
programmer’s profession and the increasing academic acknowledgement of com-
puter science.19 These developments resulted in a range of problems which have
been identified as a software crisis in the late 60s and (especially) early 70s by
a selected group of people. Dijkstra, during his Turing award lecture in 1972,
which had a profound impact on the community, used the term software crisis
as follows (17, pp. 860–861):20
[In the early days] one often encountered the naive expectation that,
once more powerful machines were available, programming would no
longer be a problem, for then the struggle to push the machine to its
limits would no longer be necessary and that was all that program-
ming was about wasn’t it? But in the next decades something com-
pletely different happened: more powerful machines became avail-
able, not just an order of magnitude more powerful, even several
orders of magnitude more powerful. But instead of finding ourselves
in a state of eternal bliss with all programming problems solved, we
found ourselves up to our necks in the software crisis [m.i.]! [...] The
major cause is ... that the machines have become several orders of
magnitude more powerful! To put it quite bluntly, as long as there
were no machines, progamming was no problem at all; when we
had a few weak computers, programming became a mild problem,
15For a discussion of the introduction of the so-called language metaphor in computer sci-
ence, see [36].
16Amongst others, he connected this work to combinatory logic, lambda calculus and re-
cursive functions. See [13] for a detailed discussion.
17See e.g. [4].
18See [34].
19See for instance [18].
20The 1968 NATO Software Engineering conference is the classic reference for the origin of
the term ‘software crisis’. As it has been argued in [24], one should be careful in overestimating
the impact of this so-called crisis and the NATO conference. In fact, as he shows, the idea
of a ‘software crisis’ entered common use [....] following the 1972 Turing Award lecture [...]
[of] Edsger Dijkstra
6
and now we have gigantic computers, programming has become an
equally gigantic problem.[...] To put it in nother way: as the power
of available machines grew by a factor of more than a thousand, so-
ciety’s ambition to apply these machines grew in proportion, and it
was the poor programmer who found his job in this exploded field
of tension between ends and means.
Typical problems that started arising were software failure, unreliability and
malfunctioning, at least partly due to large software projects becoming too
complex to manage. These problems were considered by some the result of
the theory lagging behind the demands and expectations of society, a reflection
which lead to the development of a new discipline called software engineer-
ing. Software engineering at that time, with a slightly more confined meaning
than today, was referring to the use of formal methods within programming
as a means to attack typical problems of this so-called crisis. At the same
time it was also aimed at providing a more scientific status that a part of the
community aspired to ascribe to the discipline by developing a solid theoret-
ical methodology. Figures of the calibre of Dijkstra and Hoare defended the
programs-as-proofs identity, with criteria of correctness and termination being
paramount and to be proven in a logical or mathematical fashion.21 New tech-
niques were developed to integrate more logical approaches into programming
methods.22 For example, Dijkstra’s method of ‘structured programming’ was
developed to deal with, amongst others, problems of correctness;23 Scott and
Strachey developed denotational semantics for programming;24 and de Bruijn
aimed at formally verifying the whole of mathematics by writing AUTOMATH,
a language also making use of types to induce the identity of theorems and
output of an automated derivation.25 But while these researches pointed at the
primal role of logic in the design and construction of programs, the essential
and delicate balance between the theoretical and practical aspects pertaining
to computing was becoming pressing. The introduction of, for instance, the
typed lambda-calculus into computer science was meant as a faithful modelling
of well-specified computations in formally correct expressions. But the former,
when intended as calculations actually executed on finite machines, operated
by fallible programmers and users in a given social context, exceed the degree
of precision of the latter by a much higher level of complexity. This position,
counter-balancing the formalist view on correctness and validation with a more
practical approach, was soon put forward by part of the computer science com-
munity. The reference to the social and multi-layered aspect of computational
well-functioning (see e.g. [12]), as well as the practical impossibility to exclude
essential aspects of computational malfunctions due to the physical nature of
21See for instance [15] and [30]. The story and origin of the extended Curry-Howard iso-
morphism is still partly unclear and deserves an analysis on its own.
22See the paper by Maarten Bullynck in this volume.
23See [16].
24See [40].
25See [11].
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the processes involved (see e.g. [19]) were considered.26
Despite tensions between those insisting on the role of logic and those less
convinced of its applicability have been recurring throughout the history of
computer science, the need for formal methods is higher than ever. One major
reason, present already in the above quotes by von Neumann and Dijkstra, is
that the more ambitious society becomes in applying computation, the lesser
control we have over what is happening inside the (networks of) machines. As
a result, automatic certification relying heavily on formal methods is becoming
increasingly important, especially in the context of cyber-physical and safety-
critical computational systems like in avionics and the autonomous automotive
industries, i.e. in applications where computations are no longer taken in iso-
lation, but rather as elements in sensitive connection to humans.27 Hence, it
is clear that the relations between formal logic, engineering practices and phys-
ical machinery characterize some fundamental issues within computer science
and its history: tensions and convergences which one needs to reflect upon to
understand the nature of the discipline.
Until recently, however, besides few historical and philosophical contribu-
tions,28 not much attention was devoted to the complexity of this topic. One
reason for this is that in order to study the historical and philosophical influ-
ence of formal methods in computer science, one should also engage with the
technology: to understand in what sense, for instance, Post production systems
have played a role in the history of compiler design, or how a formal system
like Hoare logic is the basis of systems used today to reason about programs in
terms of states of the store and the heap. The need of technical understanding
to write a proper history of computer science was recently at the centre of a
debate within the community of historians of computing. In the 2014 Kailath
lecture at Stanford titled Let’s not dumb down the history of computer science,
Donald Knuth, a very well-known computer scientist, explained his regret for
the so-called professionalization of the history of computing which has implied
an increasing neglect of technical content for the sake of more socially, institu-
tional, politically and/or industry oriented histories. This talk resulted in lively
discussions and finally a short piece [27] in the Communications of the ACM.
A similar argument holds for the philosophical community as well. Computing
and engineering at large have always been a significant source of inspiration for
26The complex formulation of notions of formal correctness, reliable design, effective de-
bugging and so on are all still central issues in the academic and industrial development of
mainframe and especially software systems. For a philosophical, rather than strictly technical,
categorization and definition of the problem of computational errors, see e.g. [21] and [20].
For the argument on the practical impossibility of program correctness, see for example the
paper by Selmer Bringsjord in this volume. For the evolution of computational systems in
relation to the user, see for example the paper by Graham White in this volume.
27By way of example, consider the recent development of a formally verified C compiler,
part of the CompCert project (See http://compcert.inria.fr/motivations.html): ‘[This
compiler is not] [f ]or non-critical, “everyday” software [where] bugs introduced by the compiler
are negligible compared to those already present in the source program [but for] safety-critical
or mission-critical software, where human lives, critical infrastructures, or highly-sensitive
information are at stake.’.
28See e.g. [33], [2], [32], [9], [45].
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philosophical research. Such research has been directed either to the conceptual
analysis of important and largely appealing themes, for example incompleteness
and complexity; or it has focused on non-technical, often ethically oriented top-
ics. This has attracted some interest from computer science practitioners, who
have indulged in technically-aware reflections on their discipline, but a common
field recognised by all parties, where philosophers dare to be really technically
prepared is still missing.
Precisely to tackle such need for a history and philosophy of computing
that also engages with actual computational and programming practices, the
DHST Commission for the History and Philosophy of Computing (HaPoC) was
founded in 2013.29 One of the aims of the commission is to organize regular
meetings, providing an open platform for historians, philosophers, computer sci-
entists, logicians, programmers, mathematicians (and all other figures involved
by the field at large) to discuss across their own disciplinary boundaries and to
offer the open environment required to reflect on all facets of computing. The
present collection of papers, which resulted from several HaPoC events, aims
exactly at this kind of reflection, by bringing to the fore the problem of bridging
the gap between formal methods and practices of computing. We approach var-
ious apparently distinct issues concerning computability at large, correctness,
software design and implementation, program semantics and human-computer
interaction, with each contribution being commonly characterised in a double
way: first, each author plays with the combination of historical background
and philosophical insight we consider essential in exploring a technical and the-
oretical relevant issue in computing; second, every contribution insists on the
relevance of logic and formal methods as the counterpart to the engineering
practice, constituting the double face of the discipline. The arrangement of the
papers in this volume also reflects a historically aware presentation of facts and
topics.
We have already briefly pointed out above how the most common lore, which
traces the history of computing back to the role of Turing, is largely a simplifi-
cation. The logical roots of computer science are to be contextualised in a larger
set of research fields and figures, each contributing specific and very crucial re-
sults to the field as we know it today. Certainly Turing deserves a prominent
position. As historians and history-aware philosophers of computing, however,
it is of the greatest relevance to understand how, why and by whom Turing
came to be recognised very often as the father of the discipline. This is the
task that Edgar Daylight is set to approach: with a historical analysis that
stretches over results in logic including not only Turing, but recasts of his re-
sults by Kleene, Rosenbloom, Markov, he is able to identify a particular group
of actors – including Booth, Carr, Gill and Gorn – who were looking for a more
theoretical foundation of computation and found it in (recast versions of) the
work of Turing.
The two decades across the ’60s and the ’70s have been often identified as
29The website of the commission can be found at www.hapoc.org. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the need for more technical content within the history and philosophy of computing,
see [14].
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a turning point for the development of computing as an academic and scientific
discipline: many of the research methods currently at its core were initiated at
this time, both at the low-level of machines, the higher-level of programs and
the communications between them. The software crisis and the problematic
confrontation with implementations solicited the development of new program-
ming paradigms and semantic theories of programming like the denotational,
axiomatic and event-based ones, aimed at a mathematical theory independent
from particular implementations and allowing, for instance, to prove program
correctness or equivalence. The problems associated with connecting the formal
approaches with the practice of computing became apparent also in this context.
Maarten Bullynck reflects on the case of the computation of a list of primes to
discuss stepwise, structured and formally verified programming and considers
the limitations imposed by user-machine interaction in implementations for sys-
tems such as the MULTICS and the ILLIAC IV. In what could be seen as a
parallel exploration of the limitations of logical approaches to the semantics of
programs, Felice Cardone reconstructs the historical and conceptual evolution
of the principle of continuity from recursion in the 50s, through Scott’s deno-
tational semantics at the end of the ’60s and Dijkstra’s work in the ’70s: in
this formal analysis, continuity is identified and explained as the principle that
qualifies performed computations as finitary, and hence bounded by the time-
related constraints of mathematical computation to be executed by machines, a
notion that will have large conceptual consequences in modern computing, e.g.
for concurrency.
The mentioned debate on the notion and theoretical possibility of formal
verification is at the core of the duality between logic and engineering in com-
puter science. In open contrast with practitioners like Dijkstra and Hoare who
understood programs as instances of proofs and insisted on the need to prove
their correctness by logical means, the highly debated and influential paper [19]
claimed the impossibility of such a request, in view of the physical, non-purely
theoretical nature of computational objects. The debate on program verification
has spanned for decades, and has never been really closed, still generating con-
flicts of ideas today. In his contribution, Selmer Bringsjord re-opens the debate
at a different level, by attacking the very core of Fetzer’s argument, namely its
logical consistency, claiming it is a self-refuting position on the basis that it is
construed on the very same fallibility that the original attributes to computing.
Hence, once again, logical correctness and physical implementation of compu-
tation (in humans or in machines) are opposed and compared, in what seems
to reinforce the dual nature of this field. This relation between the logic of the
machine and the logic of the human is at the core of the analysis of the final
contribution: Graham White explores – with the help of many historical exam-
ples – how the various levels of abstraction from hardware on, are controlled by
languages that are meant to accommodate the human user’s intention and her
understanding of the computation to be performed, and how such relation moves
also in the opposite direction, with improvements in hardware and software to
force accommodations by the user.
With this collection we hope to strengthen the bridge between the commu-
10
nity of historians and philosophers of logic with computing. It is essential that
both areas better understand and appreciate how computing and the related
machinery represent the evolving state of formal logic; and how the latter has
been a crucial, although not unique element, in the evolution of the former.
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